Srimad BhagavadGita

In the previous śloka, Kṛṣṇa told Arjuna that even if he was a dehātmavādi, there was no reason for him to grieve. This is being explained further in this śloka. Kṛṣṇa says,"Death is indeed certain for everything that is born and rebirth is certain for that which has died. Therefore, to grieve over what is unavoidable does not befit you." 

Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna why he should not grieve. The reason is, it is inevitable that anything born dies and this is seen all over the world without exception.

jātasya hi mṛtyuḥ dhruvo (For everything born, death is certain)   

mṛtyuḥ death   

dhruvaḥ (is certain) Impossible to alter or oppose 

hi (indeed) It's a term that emphasises on the significance of the fact. Its usage here conveys the following

meanings:

1)Everything born in this world is indeed destroyed in this way. Everything born is seen as something that is

sure to die.

2)Kṛṣṇa gives Arjuna the reason to not grieve. The reason is that it is inevitable that anything born dies and

this is seen all over the world without exception.

mṛtasya ca janma dhruvaṃ (Similarly for anything that dies there is certainly rebirth)   

Here a doubt may arise: In this world, we see with our own eyes that anything that takes birth dies too. But, we do not see the occurrence of rebirth of anything that dies. Since Kṛṣṇa as an ācārya is instructing this to us, HIS disciples, we will accept it. But how can this be considered as a world renowned known fact as suggested by the word 'hi' in the śloka? Let's take the example of a mud pot. In this world we see a mud pot which was not there earlier, being newly created. We see it breaking into pieces and thus dying. However after breaking we do not see it being created into a mud pot again. Moreover, if it is said that everything that is destroyed is certainly recreated again, then the miseries which get destroyed after we experience them will also have to get recreated. This endless process of destruction and recreation of miseries would mean that the state of mokṣa which is the ultimate end of miseries will not exist. All our attempts to rid ourselves of disease, enemies etc will be in vain since they will keep getting recreated after getting destroyed. If this is the case, death of relatives should not cause any sorrow as they will anyways be recreated again. Hence, it may not be correct to say that everything that gets destroyed is born again. 

Clarification: For anything to be created, raw material is a must. Everything is created out of already existing material only. It is not possible to create anything new out of nothing. Why so? What is the need for the same thing to be recreated after its destruction? Isn't a new mud pot that did not exist previously, being created?

The answer to these is that actuality, creation and destruction are just the two different states of existence of the already existing object. Let's go back to our example of the mud pot. With the already existing water, mud is made into a lump and then into a pot on the potter's wheel with the aid of tools. Since the lump state is destroyed we say that the lump state is gone. This transformation of the lump into a pot is the death of the lump state and birth of the pot state. Similarly when the pot breaks, it is the death of the pot state and birth of the shards (broken pieces) state. From this example, we come to know that when a thing in one state is transformed into another state, destruction of its earlier state is called death and its appearance in the new state is called birth. Since the pot state goes and the shards appear, it is not wrong to say that everything that dies certainly takes birth in another form. With this, the first concern that 'we do see that all things born die but rebirth is not evident', is resolved.

Now, coming to the next concern. It is not right to say that since it is inevitable that everything destroyed will be re-created, all the pain experienced by us will also keep getting recreated and the state of mokṣa will become unachievable. The soul itself is full of consciousness, it also has consciousness as an attribute. A clay oil lamp's example will help us understand this better. There is a stable part of light at the centre of the wick and there is effulgence that spreads from it. Similarly, the soul is made up of consciousness that exists in a stable state in one place in the body and is called dharmi jñāna or substantive consciousness. The form of knowledge that spreads from this spot to the rest of the body is called dharma bhūta jñāna or attributive consciousness.) Contamination occurs only to the dharma bhūta jñāna of the soul and this happens when identification with the body happens. Pain(misery) and pleasure are the two different states of the soul's dharma bhūta jñāna. As a result of karma and a particular body acquired on account of it, while in this world, the embodied soul's dharma bhūta jñāna repeatedly alters into either pleasure or misery due to contact with the objects of the world. When the soul's accumulated karmas end, the process of acquiring different bodies ends too. This is the state of mokṣa. In this state, the soul's dharma bhūta jñāna acquires its natural state of maha ānanda (great bliss), which once acquired remains forever. In this way, the concern about the re-creation of miseries is addressed too. 

When a relative dies, the state of being our relative is over and another state of not being our relative begins. It is natural for worldly people who derive joy from relations to experience pain when relatives die. With a disease comes the state of suffering for the body. Disease free state gives comfort. Hence it is natural for one to attempt achieving a disease free state for this temporary comfort. The attempt to destroy enemies is for similar reasons. From all of the above, we conclude that it is not wrong to say that everything that gets destroyed is born again. Some objections can be raised about this by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy. They are clarified at the end of this purport.

tasmād aparihāryerthe na tvaṃ śocitumarhasi In this way, for the transforming substance called body, the transformations namely birth and death are unavoidable. Hence it is not appropriate for you to grieve in this unavoidable matter.

   aparihārye (unavoidable) 'O Arjuna! It does not befit you to grieve like this.' Why? The word 'aparihārye'

answers this. Because the transformations in the body namely birth and death are unavoidable.

Summary:

In this śloka, Kṛṣṇa first explains to Arjuna that 'anything born dies and anything that dies is reborn in a different form/state' and then tells him not to grieve about this which is inevitable.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Objections that can be raised by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy and their answers are discussed below.

Objection: According to their philosophy, when a pot is created from a lump of mud with the aid of a throwing stick and potter's wheel, the end result is an altogether new product called the pot, totally different from the lump of mud. Similarly when thread is woven on a loom, cloth is formed which is totally different from the threads used. In these two examples mud and threads are the material cause (upādāna kāraṇa), pot and cloth are the resultant products (kārya), instruments like the throwing stick, potter's wheel, loom, etc, are the auxiliary cause (sahakāri kāraṇa) and the activities performed by them are the transforming activities. It is seen that for material causes (mud, thread) to transform into resultant products (pot, cloth), transforming activities have to be performed on them with the auxiliary causes (throwing stick, potter's wheel, loom). This leads to the conclusion that the resultant products were not previously existing but are newly created. Else, the transforming activities will end up serving no purpose. Moreover the material causes and the resultant products have different names (mud-pot, thread-cloth). Furthermore, the material causes mud, thread cannot perform the tasks of fetching water or draping someone respectively which are specific tasks performed by the resultant products pot and cloth. Those belonging to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy declare that previously non-existent, different and totally new resultant products like the mud pot and cloth are created from the material cause namely lump of clay and thread respectively. This they do based on the three reasons explained above which are,

1) Existence of transforming activities which generate results.

2) Material causes and resulting products having different names.

3) The purposes served by the materials causes and resultant products being different.

Threads which are the material cause exist as many while the resultant cloth exists as a single entity. Lump of clay and a pot have different magnitudes. The time periods of their existence are also different. Their descriptions are different, their compositions are different. After the destruction of the mud pot we see that the broken pieces do not get destroyed. They say that all these observations strengthen their conclusion that the resultant products are completely different from the material causes and are newly created. Due to their philosophy that previously non existent products get created, they are called asatkāryavādis (satkāryavāda is the doctrine that preaches the actual existence of an effect in its cause)

Clarification: Kṛṣṇa condemns the above theory by saying 'dhruvaṃ janma mṛtasya ca' (for anything that dies there is certainly rebirth). This is explained in detail with logical reasoning.

When materials like a lump of mud and threads acquire a certain arrangement, they are called pot and cloth respectively. No new substances are created in these arranged states. Until the last thread is woven into the arrangement, even the asatkāryavādis cannot call it a cloth. They will have to address it as a certain arrangement of threads. Even after the last thread is woven, it still continues to be an arrangement of threads which is named as a cloth for the sake of convenience. At times we see that a huge bale of a single thread is used to weave cloth. In such a case, since there is only a single component thread involved, even the asatkāryavādis will agree that this cloth is a certain arrangement of that single thread and not an altogether new constitution that is created. In the same way, even when a number of threads are arranged in a certain manner to make a cloth, it must be realised that the cloth is still a specific arrangement of threads and not something entirely new that is created. asatkāryavādis must be questioned if they can quote one instance where the constituent is totally different from the constitution. No one including them can claim that a cloth is anything other than a particular arrangement of threads.

Claim by asatkāryavādīs: If asatkāryavādis claim that a totally different resultant product is created from the constituent material causes due to the action of the transforming activities necessary for them to be transformed into resultant product leading to all differences like differences in names, tasks performed by them, their count, magnitude, descriptions, arrangement, time periods of existence between the material causes and the resultant product.

Condemnation of the claim: This theory claimed by asatkāryavādis cannot be accepted. Reasons are as follows.

We do not say that no new substance comes into existence or no new beginning occurs as believed by the Sāṃkhya theory. (Sāṃkhya or satkāryavāda propounds that the effect exists in its material cause even prior to its production. For eg: Curd was present in milk before it came into existence as curd. Hence, the effect is not a real beginning or a new creation) Because saying so would make all transforming activities useless. We say that no new substance is created but a variety of different arrangements cause new states of the same substance to occur. Hence transforming activity and all differences previously mentioned refer to the state change of the same substance from the cause state to the result state. It is not the case that a totally new substance with all the mentioned differences is created. Evidence also does not support this view. Moreover, we see that the weight of the material causes is the same as the weight the of resultant product. For eg: when water is added to a lump of mud and made into a pot, weight of the lump and the resultant pot are the same; when threads are woven into a cloth, combined weight of the threads is same as the weight of the cloth. When it is claimed that a resultant product different from its material causes is newly created, its weight must be different from the aggregate weight of its material causes, which is not the case. The weight of the parts constituting the whole is the same as the weight of the whole and this fact is indisputable. Due to all these reasons we conclude that it is not right to say that an altogether new product is created. The same has been told in Mahābhārata mokṣa dharma too, yadi dravyāntaram kāryam kāranebhyo bhavēdiha | gurutvamatiricyet kārye tacca na dṛśyate || dvipalam ghaṭa ityētdvayapadeśō na yujyate || (to assume that the cause and the result are totally different, their weights must be different. However, this is not seen anywhere. The lump of mud and pot weigh the same.)

Thus, by proving that creation and destruction are the different states of the same substance, the above claim by the asatkāryavādis (of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy) is condemned.

​

Q: Creation can be agreed as one state of the substance, but how can destruction, which is the absence of the substance and the perceivable opposite of creation be agreed as another state of the same substance?

A: The answer is that, when a substance is destroyed, we do not consider the 'absence' as another new substance. In worldly usage, we often hear people say, 'the pot is not there', ' the artefact is not there'. To denote 'not being there', we do not see any need for the creation of a new substance called 'absence' here. These activities like creation and destruction can be shown as the state changes undergone by the same substance, hence there is no need to introduce the creation of a new substance here.

Q: When changes in the pot's state like change in its colour occur, it is not called 'destruction of the

pot'. But when changes in the pot's state like breakage occur, it is called 'destruction of the pot'. Why?

A: States acquired are of two types 1) similar state and 2) contrary state. After its creation from a lump of

mud with the aid of a potter's wheel and throwing stick, when the colourless pot is baked in a furnace it

gets its red colour. This new state of the pot as a red pot is a similar state to the pot state before baking

and hence it is not termed as the 'destruction of the pot'. When the same pot changes into pieces, the

new state of 'broken pieces' is a contrary state to the pot state, hence it is termed as the 'destruction of

the pot'. 

    Q: Contrary states must occur between a substance that is existing (bhāva) and its absence or non-

existence (abhāva). Here both pot and broken pieces are states of a substance that is existing (bhāva).

How can these be called contrary states? 

        A: We see contrasts between heat and cold, darkness and light, etc. These are all existing (bhāva) and

contrary too. Hence it will have to be agreed that contrary states can both be bhāva(existing). Moreover,

since naiyāyikās opine that the absence in the absent state is also bhāva (something that exists), they

also agree with existing contrasts. Hence we conclude that contrary states are determined based on the

change in attributes of the substance and it is not the case that they occur between a substance that is

existing (bhāva) and its absence. Otherwise, a Tārkika who considers both bhāva (existence) and abhāva

(absence) to be substances, will not be able to acknowledge contrast between bhāva and abhāva

The naiyāyika who considers the non-existence (abhāva) i.e the absence of something also as a

substance, agrees to five types of abhāva namely Prāgabhāva, Pradhvamsābhāva, Anyonyābhāva,

Atyantābhāva, Saṃsargābhāva.

Each will be dealt with below and proved to be an existing substance (bhāva).

        1)Prāgabhāva is the abhāva (absence) of the substance prior to its creation. He says that before the

appearance of the mud pot, it was the pot's Prāgabhāva.

        Our Point: The pot state's prior contrary state is the 'lump of mud state'. This is what they call                

Prāgabhāva.

        2)Pradhvamsābhāva is the absence of the substance post its destruction. He says that the

pot's Pradhvamsābhāva is the state after the mud pot is destroyed. 

        Our Point: The post-contrary state of the 'pot state' is 'the broken pieces state'. This is what they call              Pradhvamsābhāva.

        3)Anyonyābhāva is mutual non-existence. A pot is not a table and a table is not a pot. He says that

Anyonyābhāva is the non-existence of a table as a pot and a pot as a table while both exist in the same

state (state of existence as pot and table).

        Our Point: Anyonyābhāva is the absence of attributes of one object in another object and vice-versa at

the same time. Here, the attributes of a table which are specific to it and which are not present in

the pot and vice-versa at the same time is what they call Anyonyābhāva.

        4)Atyantābhāva means the absence of one thing in another at all times, past, present and the future i.e

in all the states. Table is not present in the pot at any time. They call this Atyantābhāva.

        Our Point: Here too there is a difference in the attributes of the table and the attributes of the pot at all

times. This is what they call Atyantābhāva.

        5)Saṃsargābhāva states the absence of one substance in another. They say that the three namely                  Prāgabhāv, Pradhvamsābhāva and Atyantābhāva which are different from Anyonyābhāva get the name

Saṃsargābhāva.

        Our Conclusion: The effect of time and place or the states acquired due to their effect are addressed

as abhāva here. Therefore, their point that no specific substance called 'abhāva' exists is not proved. It is

just that, when a substance in the created state transforms into its contrary state, it acquires the

destroyed state but does not become totally absent.

A doubt might arise here: When we accept that acquiring the next contrary state of 'broken pieces' is

called the pot's destruction, then, as the state changes from 'broken pieces' to 'powder' it will become the

destruction of the destroyed state and it will have to be said that the pot has reappeared (since everything

that dies is reborn). As the lump of mud is called the pot's Prāgabhāva (prior state) and there is no

Prāgabhāva (prior state) for the lump state, then either the pot will have to exist prior to the lump or the pot never existed before.

Clarification: It is not that only one state immediately following the 'pot state' is its contrary state. The

states after the pot state which are 'broken pieces', 'powder state', 'atomic state', etc. are all contrary states

to the pot state. Since this sequence of contrary states following the 'pot state' are agreed the first issue

pointed out in the question does not arise at all. Even the Tārkikas who consider Pradhvamsābhāva as 'non-

existence' will have to agree to such a sequence of contrary states which follow a state. As said, mahī

ghaṭatvam ghaṭataḥ kapālikā, kapālikā cūrṇarajas, tatoṇuḥ Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.12.42 (lump of mud

acquires the pot state, from the pot the broken pieces state comes, pieces become powder, from powder

state come the atoms). Hence, at each of these contrary states, it is appropriate to say that 'the pot is

destroyed now'. Now coming to the second issue raised related to Prāgabhāva. A sequence of contrary prior

states too can be shown just the way the sequence of states that follow is shown. This concept of prior and

post sequence of contrary states has to be accepted by the naiyāyikas too. Otherwise their theory will also

encounter the issues listed in the question.

Thus the conclusion is that, as in the case of a lump of mud, it is inevitable for any substance to transform

into different states sequentially. This is explained in the first and second pādams of this B.G śloka.

    A last doubt that can arise: Based on this conclusion it is agreed that, 'it is inevitable for anything

created (like the pot) to get destroyed, but not that 'anything destroyed is born again'. We do not practically

see that an object destroyed is born again as the same object. If a body after destruction would be created

again, Arjuna would not grieve over it. There is no illustration that can be stated for re-creation of the same

object.

    Clarification: We did not say that a substance is reborn in the same state in which it was before getting

destroyed. We are saying that it will be born in a different state. A substance in the 'pot state' when

destroyed, is born as the 'broken pieces' state. The 'broken pieces state' is the destroyed state with

reference to the 'pot state' and the same 'broken pieces state' is the birth state with reference to itself.

Destruction always means transformation of a substance from a prior state to the next state. This next state itself is the birth state for the substance that has acquired this state. Hence 'anything destroyed is reborn' is

a correct statement and implies the statement that 'anything born is destroyed'. Both are inevitable. Hence it

is appropriate to tell Arjuna with this illustration that if he is grieving over the death of the insentient

body, he should rejoice about rebirth of the body too in another state/form.