Srimad BhagavadGita

In the previous śloka, Kṛṣṇa established the eternal nature of the soul with reasons. In this śloka, HE establishes with reasons the transient nature of the body. Kṛṣṇa said, “It is said in the śāstras that these visible bodies of the embodied soul are arranged for the soul to experience the fruits of his actions, hence after the experience is complete, these bodies get destroyed. The soul has no birth, no end, is the enjoyer of the insentient enjoyable substances and totally different from them. O Arjuna! Therefore fight.”

This śloka and the previous one further strengthen the śloka B.G 2.16 statement nāsato vidyate… .

antavanta ime dehāḥ nityasya uktāḥ śarīrinaḥ (The śāstras say that these bodies of the embodied soul which is eternal, are destructible)

ime (These) While saying so, Kṛṣṇa pointed to the visible material bodies of all those standing in front of

HIM including Arjuna, made up of a combination of the five mahābhutas / elements namely ether,

air, fire, water and earth.

dehāḥ (Bodies) The Sanskṛt word deha comes from the dhātu (root verb) diha upacaye meaning 'to gain

    upacayam (growth or increase)'.

antavantaḥ (Are destructible, have antaṃ- an end) Why are these bodies destructible? Because they are

dehas. It is seen in this world that any created object such as a pot, jar, etc, which is made up of

different components gets destroyed too. Based on this observation it can be deduced that the deha which is

composite and characterised by growth is subject to destruction too.

nityasya antavanta uktāḥ ime (These bodies of the eternal souls are said to be temporary in nature by

the śāstras) Statements from the śāstras such as nityo nityānāṃ…Kaṭha Up 2.2.13 (Eternal among the

eternals) tell us that the soul is eternal and statements such as puṇyaḥ vai puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati

... Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up (The jīva receives a puṇya śarīra (virtuous body) as a result of his good actions

and pāpa śarīra (sinful body) as a result of forbidden actions performed by him), tell us that the bodies are

temporary by nature.

śarīrinaḥ Since the jīva is embodied in a śarīra, he is called śarīri. Deha is his śarīra here. Close

observation shows that the bond between the jīva and his śarīra is nothing but karmic. Soul is the

experiencer of karmas (results of earlier actions) and śarīras are arranged to facilitate these experiences.

Soon after the experience is over, the śarīras get destroyed. śīryate iti śarīram (as it undergoes decay it is

called śarīra), the origin of the word śarīra too certifies the same.

Three reasons determining the transient nature of the body are mentioned in the first part of this śloka and the fourth one is derived from the previous śloka. They are as follows,

1)As suggested by the word 'ime', the body being a combination of five mahābhutas /elements is one reason for the destructible nature of the body.

2)As suggested by the word 'dehaḥ', its characteristic nature to grow and its composite form (having parts) is the second reason for the destructible nature of the body.

3)As suggested by the word 'śarīriṇaḥ', the deha is meant solely for the experience of the fruits of one's karmas and is destroyed soon after. This is the third reason for the destructible nature of the body.

4)In the previous śloka, it was determined that since the soul can penetrate and pervade all insentient substances and also since there is no insentient substance like a weapon, etc, that can penetrate the soul, the soul is indestructible. From this it can be derived that since the body can be penetrated by weapons, etc, the body is destructible. This is the 4th reason for the destructible nature of the body.

anāśinaḥ aprameyasya (The jīva who is without an ending, the jīva who is the enjoyer, distinctly different from all the insentient substances that are his enjoyables) With these words of the śloka, some more reasons for establishing the eternal nature of the soul are stated. The soul is addressed as nitya (one having no birth) in the first part of this śloka.

The below series of questions and answers help us understand Kṛṣṇa's explanation in greater detail.

Q: If Kṛṣṇa is asked why HE calls the soul nitya in the first part of the śloka?

A: Kṛṣṇa answers this with the word anāśinaḥ in this part of the śloka. Anāśina is one who is unfit for

destruction, impossible to be destroyed. Since the soul is anāśina- unfit for destruction, it implies that it is

nitya.

Q: Is anāśinaḥ not a repetitive usage after the usage of the word nityaḥ for the soul in the 1st part of the

śloka? Will punarukti doṣa not arise?

A: It cannot be considered as a repetitive usage for the following reasons:

1) The word anāśinaḥ reasons the concept of soul’s nityatva i.e eternality and thus establishes the

concept further.

  2) Nityasya conveys the meaning 'having no birth' and anāśinaḥ conveys the meaning 'having no destruction'.

  3) One word conveys that there is no gross destruction and the other conveys that there is no subtle

destruction for the soul.

Q: The next question is: How can the soul be declared as anāśina (indestructible)? 

A: Kṛṣṇa's answer to this is 'aprameya'. Soul can be rightly called anāśina because it is aprameya (without

prameya). The soul is distinctly different from all the insentient substances which are incapable of knowing

themselves and can only be known by others. The soul is the knower by nature and therefore it is unfit for

destruction. Eg: A pot does not know that it is a pot. It can neither make itself known to others nor can it

know others. Prameya is the name for such insentient substances which lack knowledge, which are known

by others, enjoyed by others and subject to destruction. In addition to being known by others and enjoyed

by others, the soul can know itself and be an enjoyer too. It is thus different from the prameya and is

called aprameya. The Bhagawad Gītā śloka 13.1 etadyo vetti, tam...prāhuḥ kṣetrajña iti tad vidaḥ

(The learned call the jīva who is the knower of kṣētra-the body, as Kṣētrajña) also describes the soul as the

knower. The phrase 'tad vidaḥ' here tells us that there are people who have known the soul to be the

Kṣētrajña. From this it is clear that aprameyasya does not mean the 'Jīva, the knower, who cannot be

known by anyone'. It means 'The jīva, who is the knower of all and the enjoyer of fruits of his actions'. It

was determined in the first part of this śloka that the body is transient in nature since it is created solely for

experiencing the fruits of his karmas and in this part of the śloka it is being shown that since the soul is the

experiencer of the fruits of karmas, it is eternal. This set of statements in the śloka stands as a sample,

implying the same for the other two reasons mentioned in the first part of the śloka and their contradictions

i.e Body grows and is composite therefore it is transient. Contrarily, the soul is unchanging and non-

composite therefore it is eternal. Body is a combination of one or more substances, therefore it is transient,

contrarily the soul is unitary, therefore it is eternal. 

The destructible nature of the body and indestructible nature of the soul are discussed in greater detail at the end of this śloka for the benefit of the seekers. Kindly refer to the same.

tasmāt yuddhyasva bhārata (O descendent of Bharata! The conclusion of all the prior discussions is that you must fight)

bhārata O Arjuna, you who is born in the lineage of the illustrious Bharata, if you do not perform your

rightful duty of fighting the war, it will bring disgrace to your illustrious lineage.

tasmāt (Therefore) As the body's nature is to get destroyed and soul's nature is to never get destroyed,

both are not worthy of grief. Therefore O Arjuna...

yuddhyasva (You must perform your duty of fighting the war) The Pūrvamīmāṃsakas perception is that

the whole purpose of fighting the war is to attain the desired result. They say 'obtain the fruit of fighting the

war'. This is not correct. The correct way is to view the act of fighting the war as a duty. This is known from

Kṛṣṇa's answer to the question, 'why should the war be fought?' in B.G 2.1 as 'so’mṛtatvāya kalpate' (for

attainment of mokṣa). Likewise Arjuna's concern that, 'Fighting the war will bring a lot of pain', has also

been addressed by Kṛṣṇa earlier in BG  2.14 mātrā sparśās tu.. and B.G 2.15 yaṃ hi na vyathayantyete...to

courageously bear the unavoidable pain the weapons would cause to him and the others.

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Below is the discussion in greater detail about the transient nature of the body and the eternal nature of the soul. The doubts that might arise in this regard are raised and also cleared most effectively by our pūrvācāryas.

Four reasons stated for the transient/destructible nature of the body are

1)The body is made up of a combination of the five mahābhutas, hence it is destructible.

2)The body undergoes constant growth/change and is a composite entity (made up of parts), hence it is

destructible.

3)The body is an instrument for experiencing the fruits of one's actions and lasts only until the experience lasts,

hence it is destructible.

4)The body can be penetrated and pervaded by weapons, etc, which can destroy it, hence it is destructible.

Contrary reasoning of the above, supports the eternal/indestructible nature of the soul. Factors which assert the non-composite unitary natures of the soul are,

The soul always addresses itself as 'I'. When the soul views the different bodies, all the parts making up the

different bodies and everything in this universe, it says 'I am knowing this'. If the soul was an aggregate of

many parts, it would address itself as 'we'. It is commonly observed that in anything made up of parts, envy,

friction, etc, among the parts is inevitable. Since none of this occurs in the soul, it is certain that the soul has

no parts. Hence, this non-composite soul which is different in its characteristics from the composite

destructible body is eternal.

When we examine the body, we see that all its parts are made up of a combination of the 5 elements. Teeth,

bones and such other parts have more of the earth element, blood has more of the water element. Similarly, we see that every organ has more of one element compared to the other four. No such differentiation is seen in

the soul. kṛtsnaḥ prajñānaghanaḥ Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up 6.5.13 The vedas proclaim that the soul is made up of

knowledge alone. Hence, due to its distinction from the body which is made up of a combination of the 5

elements, the unitary soul is eternal.

Additionally, the soul's nature to be the experiencer of fruits of its own actions and its nature to pervade other substances while not letting any substance penetrate and destroy it, together with the two reasons stated earlier, make up four reasons for the eternal nature of the soul. They are,

1)The soul is unitary/homogeneous, hence it is indestructible.

2)The soul does not undergo any change and is non-composite, hence it is indestructible.

3)The soul is the experiencer of the fruits of one's actions and hence eternal.

4)The subtler soul can pervade all insentient substances but cannot be penetrated and pervaded by any of

them, hence it is indestructible.

So, there are a total of eight inferences listed above, four determining the transient nature of the body and four determining the eternal nature of the soul.

The various objections that can arise against these 8 inferences have been answered by the renowned Srivaiṣnava scholar Sri Vedānta Desika. They are as follows,

Objection1: The soul is eternal since it is a single uniform entity not having any parts. This inference is rejected. Uniformity and non-composite nature cannot determine the eternality of the soul. The 5 elements and their qualities are ether-hearing, air-touch, fire-form, water-taste, earth-smell. All the qualities are uniform and without any parts. However, in this world we often see that when burnt by fire the form, taste and other qualities of that substance get destroyed. Mahat, ahaṃkāra, indriyas (indiscrete nature, ego and senses created in a sequence at the time of creation) are all uniform and without any parts, but we see that they get destroyed at the time of universal deluge. Then, how can these two be considered as reasons for determining the eternality of the soul?

Answer1: First and foremost, the context of this chapter is that Arjuna is deluded and thinks that the soul can also be destroyed by weapons, fire, etc, in the war. To clear Arjuna's delusion, Kṛṣṇa wishes to establish the point that since the soul is of uniform nature and without parts, it cannot be destroyed by weapons, fire, etc. Mahat, ahaṃkāra and indriyas which are uniform by nature and without parts also cannot be destroyed by weapons, fire, etc. They only merge into unmanifest original nature called 'avyakta' at the time of universal deluge by Īśwara's will. Hence this part of the objection is overruled. Hearing, touch, form, taste and smell, etc, are qualities but not substances, hence both parts of the objection are dealt with and overruled. Can the uniform and indivisible jīva also be destroyed by Īśwara's will as is the case with mahat, etc? There is no doubt that Īśwara can destroy the soul at HIS will, however statements from the śrutis such as nityo nityānāṃ...Kaṭha Up 2.2.13 (eternal among the eternals) state that the soul is eternal which tells us that it is Īśwara's wish that the jīva be eternal and HE has resolved to never destroy the jīva.

​Objection2: The soul is indestructible since it is the experiencer. This inference is rejected. When the meaning of experiencer is taken as the experiencer of fruits of one's own actions and it is inferred that the soul is indestructible, the inference has the flaw of asādhārana anaikāntya doṣa. The doṣa can be explained as follows. For this inference, pakṣa (subject of inference) is: Jīva; sādhya (object of inference) is: indestructibility;  hetu (reason/purpose) is: being the experiencer of fruits of his own actions; vyāpti (concomitance) is: where ever there is an experiencer of fruits of own actions, there is indestructibility. This hetu is present only for the given pakṣa= jīva. For pakṣa= Īśwara, who is distinct from the jīva and eternal (thus a sapakṣi (similar instance)), this hetu is not present as HE is free from karma and its experiences. Even for pakṣa= 'insentient substances' which are distinct from the jīva and transient (thus vipakṣi (opposing instance)), this hetu is not present. Since both sapakṣi Īśwara and the vipakṣi insentient substances cannot become illustrations for this vyāpti, we conclude that this vyāpti lacks illustrations. This leads to the asādhārana anaikāntya doṣa in the inference. Since Īśwara does not have the hetu of being the experiencer of fruit of own actions though HE is a sapakṣi (due to HIS eternal nature like the jīva), the inference also suffers from the bhāgāsiddhi doṣa. When the meaning of experiencer is taken as the 'knower', the inference now becomes 'all conscious beings are eternal, since they are knowers', pakṣa is: all conscious beings; sādhya is: indestructibility/eternality; hetu (reason/purpose) is: being the knower; vyāpti (concomitance) is: where ever there is a knower, there is indestructibility/eternality. Since this hetu is present only for jīva and Īśwara and none else, like earlier, due to lack of illustrations for this vyāpti, asādhārana anaikāntya doṣa occurs.

Suppose the inference is altered to include only jīvas as 'all jīvas are eternal, since they are knowers' and Īśwara's eternality is used as an illustration for the vyāpti, then doubt about certainty on Īśwara's eternality can be raised. This is called the sandigdha sādhya vaikalyam doṣa.

Answer2: Being the experiencer of fruits of one's own actions implies that the condition of being created to facilitate the experience of the fruits of actions does not apply to this experiencer. This leads to the inference that he has no utpatti (origin). From this the inference derived is that the soul is eternal as it has no origin. For this inference, Īśwara can be quoted as the illustration for its vyāpti (wherever there is no origin, there is eternality), hence asādhārana anaikāntya doṣa does not occur. The presence of the hetu= 'having no origin' for the soul can be proved with the help of the śāstras, hence swarupāsiddhi doṣa does not occur too. If it is said that being the experiencer means being the possessor of knowledge, taking only jīvas into consideration, the inference can be stated as: 'jīva is eternal as it possesses knowledge' and Īśwara can be quoted as an illustration. Any doubts about Īśwara's eternality were cleared the moment Kṛṣṇa declared na tvevāhaṃ... in B G 2.12. The purport for this śloka also establishes Īśwara's eternality. The various śāstras which talk about Īśwara's eternality also stand as proof for it.

​Objection3: Soul is eternal, since it is the one that pervades. This inference is rejected. For this inference, pakṣa is: jīva; sādhya is: indestructibility; hetu(reason/purpose) is: being the pervader. When the meaning for pervader is taken as one who pervades into everything, the inference suffers from swarupāsiddhi doṣa. This is because the atomic soul cannot pervade into everything and Īśwara pervades into everything including the atomic soul. Hence, the nature of the hetu itself cannot be established, resulting in swarupāsiddhi doṣa.

When the meaning for pervader is taken as one who pervades into selected things, we see in the world around us that a weapon, ether, etc, which are subject to destruction also pervade only into selected things. Hence, due to lack of proper illustration, asādhārana anaikāntya doṣa occurs here.

Answer3: Sticking to the context of Kṛṣṇa's instruction in this chapter, pervasiveness here means pervasion into a weapon, fire or such other things which have the ability to destroy the body. The inference is- Soul cannot be destroyed by weapons or fire as it pervades them. This inference does not have the vyabhichāra, swarupāsiddha and anaikāntya doṣa.

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In this way, it has been shown that all the four inferences stated above to establish the eternality of the soul are without defects.

Now, objections on the four inferences stated above to establish the transient nature of the body and answers to those objections are presented below,

​Objection1: The body is destructible, as it is a composite entity made up of many parts. This inference is rejected. We see that Bhagawān's divine auspicious form, ornaments, weapons, etc, are all eternal though they have parts and are made up of the five upaniṣadhic elements paramēṣtī, pumān, viśvaḥ, nivruththaḥ and sarvaḥ. Hence for this inference vyabhicāra doṣa occurs.

Answer1: When the hetu is quoted in a more specific manner, the inference will not have vyabhicāra doṣa. For eg: The inference that 'The body is destructible as it is prākṛta (material in nature) and has parts' or the inference 'The body is destructible as it is prākṛta and a compound'. 

Objection2: The body is destructible as it exists for the experience of the fruits of actions. This inference is rejected. When the meaning of 'For the experience of fruits of actions' is taken as 'Existing as the cause for the experience of fruits of actions', this inference will suffer from vyabhicāra doṣa since both the eternal paramātma and the jīva are in a way causes for the experience of fruits of actions. When the meaning is taken as 'Created for the experience of fruits of actions', then there is no need to even mention 'For the  experience of fruits of actions. The word created alone will suffice to infer that the body is not eternal. Hence, here vyartha viseṣana doṣa will occur.

Answer2: The meaning of 'For the experience of fruits of actions' is that it is 'created only for the experience of fruits of actions'. Vyartha viseṣana doṣa will not occur. This can be explained as follows. In the case of a liberated soul, though the highest knowledge gets revealed at the time of liberation, the knowledge has been eternally present. Hence, simply saying that 'The body is destructible, as it is created' will give rise to vyabhicāra doṣa when the illustration for it is the liberated soul's revealed knowledge.

If objection is raised: As stated in Viṣṇu Dharmaḥ 104 prakāśyante na janyante (when material faults

are destroyed, the soul’s qualities become revealed) the liberated soul's knowledge is not newly created, the uncovering of knowledge is what occurs in the liberated state. Since uncovering of knowledge is only a

state of the same knowledge, there is no creation associated with this state of knowledge.

Answer: Even when the above meaning is taken, it still means that the uncovering occurred for the

knowledge in that particular liberated state only. Similarly, in our case too, to make a similar point 'For the

experience of fruit of actions' is specifically mentioned. The specific mention may appear useless, but it has a

purpose. Creation of some bodies is not visible to us like microorganisms, etc. The adjective 'For the

experience of fruits of actions' is specifically used to include the creation of such bodies too which have come into existence for the specific purpose of facilitating the experience of the fruits of actions. Another purpose

for the use of this adjective is to make the point that the body gets destroyed when the experience of fruits

of actions gets over.

Objection3: The body is transient, as it is the one that is pervaded. This inference is rejected. When the meaning of being pervaded is considered as 'One that can be pervaded by anything', the inference will suffer from swarupāsiddhi doṣa. This is because the body cannot be pervaded by mountains, etc. In truth, as the quality of being pervaded by all materials is not possible for any substance, aprasiddhi doṣa will occur too. If the meaning for being pervaded is considered as 'That which can be pervaded by some materials' then the divine auspicious form pervaded by Īśwara pervaded by HIM will have to be transient too, which is not the case. If the meaning is considered as 'That which is pervaded by the jīva', then the bodies pervaded by the eternally liberated souls will also have to be transient. The mūla prakṛti (original nature) pervaded by the jīva will also become transient then. If the meaning of being pervaded is taken as 'That which does not pervade', then there are bodies of yogis who have acquired siddhis like aṇima, which can penetrate and pervade stones, etc.  

Answer3: Going by the context of this chapter, to be pervaded here means 'to be pervaded by weapons, etc.'

If objection is raised: 'The body can be destroyed by weapons, etc, as it can be pervaded by

them'. If we go by this sāmānya vyāpti, then as Īswara pervades the mūla prakṛti (original nature), puruṣa,

kāla(time) and such others, these must also get destroyed by Īswara.

The answer: Since the inference intends to convey that the body is destroyed by weapons when it is

penetrated by them, there is no scope for this doṣa. However, if Īswara decides to destroy mūla prakṛti and

others, can anyone stop HIM? Only because Īswarā has vowed for these to be eternal, they are not

destroyed. Similarly, though the subtle body and senses which are pervaded by the jīva and ākāṣa can be

destroyed by them, it is not Īśwara's arrangement for them to be destroyed by jīva or ākāṣa, so it does not

happen. Hence it is not technically wrong to say that the body, etc, can be destroyed by jīva, etc. which

pervade them. When the inference is, 'The body is destroyed by weapons, etc, as it is pervaded by them',

which further derives the inference that 'Anything that can be pervaded by weapons, etc, can also get

destroyed by them, as it is pervaded by them' leads to the inference that, 'Anything pervaded by weapons,

etc, can get destroyed by them' for which the example is the banana stem which gets destroyed by the knife

penetrating it. When this viseṣa vyāpti is taken, there is no scope for raising the kind of objections raised in

the beginning.

If objection is raised: Though ākāṣa, etc, are pervaded by weapons, etc, they cannot be destroyed by

them, hence this inference will suffer from vyabhichāra doṣa.

The answer: This doṣa does not occur. Pervasion means to become subtle and enter inside. A substance

like ākāṣa which does not obstruct a substance like a knife through it, has the power to obstruct many

substances, implying that this substance which does not obstruct is subtler than the other substance.

Hence it is clear that ākāṣa is subtler than the knife and so pervasion by the knife into ākāṣa is not possible.

Thus no vyabhichāra doṣa occurs for this inference.

If objection is raised: Though the bodies of yogis can be pervaded by a knife, they cannot be severed by

it, hence vyabhichāra doṣa will occur for the above inference.

Answer: When such an argument is put forth, the reply is that due to the greatness of yoga, states like

aṇima are established in the bodies of yogīs which make their bodies such that pervasion of a knife into their

body itself cannot occur. In Fact their bodies are such that they can in turn penetrate into the knife, hence

vyabhichāra doṣa does not occur here either.

Doubt may arise: Since it is not possible for a yogi's body to be destroyed by weapons, is his body

indestructible?

The answer: A yogi's body can be destroyed by Īśwara's will or his own will which are subtler than his body. The same principle applies even to the bodies which acquire sturdiness with the practice of kāyakalpa, etc.  

It is thus proved that the eight inferences mentioned above for establishing the eternality of the soul and transience of the body are valid.

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A doubt may be raised: The purpose of stating the four causes to establish the transient nature of the body can be questioned. It is known to all that the body is transient. We see this in the case of some bodies. If one who fosters enmity is not aware of this nature of the body, he will not attack his enemy with weapons and will also not safeguard himself from the enemy's attack by weapons. Since transience of the body is a known fact to all and since only doubtful statements should be proved by rationale, it was a futile task to state the causes and establish the transient nature of the body here.

Clarification: It is true that the transient nature of the body which is known to all, is being established here. But this is not a futile task. Eight purposes this task serves can be listed. 

1)While establishing the eternality of the soul, both supporting and opposing illustrations have to be shown.

Like Īśwara the soul is also eternal, so Īśwara is the supportive illustration here and since the soul is not

transient like the body, the body is the opposing illustration here. Thus the 1st purpose is to show the

opposing illustration and the vyatireka vyāpti based on it.

2)Some assume that the body itself is the soul. The 2nd purpose is to show that they are both different by

establishing the eternality of the soul and transience of the body in that order.

3)The 3rd purpose is to clear the doubt that the body which can be destroyed by weapons could be protected

from such destruction with the use of medicines, etc.

4)Causing detachment with the body by showing that it has to get destroyed one way or the other is the 4th

purpose.

5)The 5th purpose is to clear Arjuna's misconception that he alone has the capability of destroying the bodies

of his enemies. This is done by establishing the destructible nature of the body with reasons.

6)By bringing awareness about the different reasons for the destructible nature of the body, it becomes possible

to explain that it is inevitable for the body to get destroyed sooner or later. This makes way for the 6th

purpose of advocating the highest purpose of complete destruction of the bondage with the body and

attainment of mokṣa by the practice of performing duties without attachment for their result.

7)The 7th purpose is to make the point that there is no purpose in struggling too hard to protect the body

as it is destructible by nature.

8)The 8th and the most significant purpose is to give the message that as the body which is an instrument

provided for performing our duties can get destroyed at any time, while this instrument lasts, one must

immediately begin practising the means for attaining liberation.

As many other such purposes can be quoted, it cannot be claimed that establishing the transience of the body is not a futile task.

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