Srimad BhagavadGita

From the previous śloka it can be inferred that Kṛṣṇa wishes to instruct Arjuna on the following,

1) Nature of the upeyam (achievable goal), which is the ātma (soul state) here.

2) Nature of the upāyam i.e the means for achieving the ātma, which includes performance of varṇāśrama based duties like ‘fighting the war’, etc.

3) Nature of the ‘body’, which is an obstruction in the attainment of this goal.   

Kṛṣṇa begins with the first of the three here, which is the nature of the goal 'ātma'. This śloka thus marks the beginning of the actual Gītā śāstra, born to explain the tattvas (real substances). A doubt may arise regarding Kṛṣṇa's choice of starting HIS instruction with the 'nature of the goal' first and then the 'nature of the means'.

Doubt: Since diligent practise of the means leads to achievement of the goal, should Kṛṣṇa not instruct about the means first rather than the nature of the goal 'ātma'?

Clarification: The above method is valid in cases where the motive is to instruct about the practise of certain means. For eg: Dvaya mantra is an upāya mantra consisting of two lines. Its primary motive is to instruct about the means to be practised. Therefore the rule suggested above applies here. The mantra's first line instructs about the 'means' and the second line mentions the 'goal'. However, in this case, it is the hour of instruction. At such times when the greatness of the goal is explained first, it develops an interest in pursuing it. This interest leads to contemplation on, 'What can be done to attain this? What are the obstructions that could be encountered? How to overcome these and achieve this goal?'. Since Arjuna is the one who has to practise the means, it is befitting that he knows about his own (soul's) nature first. Hence, Gītācārya Kṛṣṇa aptly began his instruction here with the 'nature of the goal i.e ātma'.

Kṛṣṇa said to Arjuna, “There never was a time in the past when I, who is Sarveśwara, did not exist, or you or any of these kings who are all jīvas did not exist. All of us shall never cease to exist in the future too.”

ahaṃ jātu na āsaṃ iti na Since Īswara’s eternal nature is easier to comprehend, Kṛṣṇa wished to quote it as an illustration for explaining the eternal nature of the soul. HE therefore started with it by saying, 'ahaṃ jātu na āsaṃ iti na' even though the topic of instruction is the 'nature of the soul'. 

A doubt may arise here: When Arjuna was not even certain about this soul entity which the yogis could perceive by practise, how can it be assumed that Arjuna already knew about the eternal nature of Īśwara (Lord of all), when in reality Īśwara is beyond such perception. Swami Nammālwār states in Thiruvaimozhi 1.3.6, 'It is still possible to know about the soul by hearing, contemplation or the practice of aṣṭānga yoga but impossible for this intellect to comprehend Sarveśwara's disposition. HIS first avatāra (appearance) in this material world is as Viṣṇu, the antaryāmi (in-dwelling Lord) in all, including Brahma and Rudra. HE performs the tasks of creation through Brahma, destruction through Rudra and HIMSELF as Viṣṇu amidst them maintains the universe, thus concealing HIS presence by appearing as one amongst them'. When Brahma and Rudra too are unable to visualise Paramātma’s original nature which is subtler than that of the ātma, is it possible for others like Arjuna to know about HIS eternal nature easily and to understand the soul's nature based on it? 

Clarification: Arjuna was not an atheist. He had acquired accurate knowledge about Paramapuruṣa (supreme person) from great riṣis like Nārada, Āsita, Devala, Vyāsa and others. Arjuna himself made the statement puruṣaṃ śāśvataṃ divyam B.G 10.12 (Paramapuruṣa is eternal and divine). He had travelled to Indra loka too. He was someone who knew the potency of astras (weapons), mantras, penance and himself practised them. He had the highest reverence for his gurūs and devatas. He had never deviated from his varṇāśrama duties and was always concerned about not deviating from the path of righteousness. Hence, Arjuna was surely not someone who was deluded about the existence of ātma and Paramātma distinct in nature from the body or even doubtful about their existence. However, he was not aware of some of the qualities of ātma and Paramātma and as a result he was experiencing grief. He only had a vague idea that he and Īśwara were both eternal. Though the jīva experiences birth and death in this world, as explained by statements from the vedas like na pretya sangnāsti Bṛ.Up 2.4.12 (when the jīva exits from the body, he no more has knowledge about it), since jīva has knowledge related to the body only as long as he is in that body and loses it when he leaves the body, Arjuna was certain that the jīva possessed knowledge but he was unsure about the eternal nature of the jīva. All of the above quoted statements justify that quoting Paramātma's eternal nature to explain the eternal nature of ātma, is appropriate.

ahaṃ By saying 'ahaṃ' Kṛṣṇa meant that 'I, who is Sarveśwara, the creator, destroyer and controller of all,

who is the lord of the entire creation at all the three times (past, present and future), how can I not be

existing at any of these three times? How can I, who is the creator, destroyer and controller of all, be

created, destroyed or controlled by anyone? Hence it is indisputable that I am eternal'.

jātu na āsaṃ (iti) na (never non-existent, for eternal time prior to the present) The meaning is 'na āsaṃ

(iti) tu na' i.e 'never non-existent, always existed in the past'. The usage of 'na' twice i.e double negation, is

to emphasise on the certainty of the meaning conveyed. 

na tvaṃ neme janādhipāḥ For the purpose of explanation, the sentence should be restructured as 'tvaṃ nāsīriti na; ime janādhipāḥ na āsan iti na' meaning 'neither were you ever non-existent nor these Kings who are present here'. The pronouns like 'tvam', 'ime' pointing to those in the vicinity, are representative of all the jīvas ranging from the four faced Brahma to an ant or blade of grass (brahmādi stamba paryantam). It is thus declared by Kṛṣṇa that, 'Just like ME, all the souls have existed from eternal time'. What about the future? Will all of them be destroyed in the future? This is addressed by Kṛṣṇa next.

sarve vayam ataḥ param na bhaviṣyāmaḥ iti eva na ca Will all of them be subjected to destruction in the future? This is answered here as, 'sarve vayam ataḥ param na bhaviṣyāmaḥ iti eva na ca' (Me, You, all these - all of us, shall never cease to exist here after too. We all shall always exist.) Since time is endless, in the course of time we see that even the most robust mountains get weathered and vanish. The term 'eva' was used by Kṛṣṇa to reinforce the fact that in this eternal flow of time, the souls never undergo such a destruction. Thus Kṛṣṇa declared that, 'Just as it is beyond doubt that, I who is Sarveśwara is eternal in nature, likewise all the souls which are contrary in nature to the constantly changing insentient matter called Kṣetra, hence called Kṣetrajñaḥ, are eternal too'.

A doubt may arise: In this śloka, we see that Kṛṣṇa instructs Arjuna that I, you and they are all eternal. This leads to the most logical conclusion that Kṛṣṇa talks about a distinction between HIM and other jīvas and also amongst the jīvas. However, many philosophies propound different theories about the nature of the soul. Some say that only prakṛti (nature) exists, some say that only a single soul exists and everything else is an illusion, etc. How can the above conclusion about Kṛṣṇa's statement be justified?

Clarification: Addressing the above doubt is crucial for understanding the instructions of the Bhagawad Gītā accurately. Hence it is going to be dealt with in detail. The discussion points supporting the conclusion stated by us about Kṛṣṇa's statement are as follows,

1. To start with, the absolute authority of Bhagawān Sri Kṛṣṇa is discussed.

This Kṛṣṇa is no ordinary passerby. HE is Bhagawān himself. jñāna śakti balaiśvarya vīrya tejāmsyaśeṣataḥ bhagavachchabda vācyāni vinā heyairguṇādibhiḥ Viṣṇu Purāṇa 6.5.79 (Six qualities namely untainted knowledge, energy, strength, lordship, valour and splendour together make up the the word Bhagawān.) There is a lot of such evidence in the śāstras which declares that the principal addressee for the title Bhagawān is the possessor of infinite auspicious qualities and not a single abominable quality. HE is the one that śrutis and smṛtis declare as the proprietor and Sarveśwara. tvam eva tvām vettha yo'si yo'si Yajurveda kāṭhaka 1.6 (You alone can know about yourself, whoever you are, whoever you are), this and such other statements from the vedas declare HIM as the only one who has knowledge about himself and all the others too. Such an absolute authority Kṛṣṇa, while imparting knowledge about the nature of the ātma to HIS dearest friend and disciple Arjuna, used the distinct terms 'aham', 'tvam', 'ime janādhipah' and 'sarve vayam' to convey that the jīvas in reality are distinct from HIM who is Sarveśwara and that even among the jīvas there is distinction (denoted by the words 'tvam' and 'ime').

2. Kṛṣṇa's intention to instruct about the real eternal tattvas and not illusory things is discussed next.

When the sole purpose of Kṛṣṇa's instruction was to bring Arjuna out of his delusion caused due to ignorance, Kṛṣṇa would surely not instruct Arjuna about the illusionary things visible to him in his deluded state. Hence it is certain that, when Kṛṣṇa used the terms 'aham', 'tvam', 'ime', 'vayam', HE was instructing Arjuna about the real eternal tattvas and not illusory things. Usage of the distinct terms 'aham', 'tvam', 'ime', 'vayam' by Kṛṣṇa thus logically leads to our conclusion that, Kṛṣṇa meant to say that there is a distinction between HIM and the other jīvas and also among the jīvas. By 'aham' HE refers to HIMSELF who is Sarveśwara. By 'tvam' HE referred to the conscious being Arjuna who was in front of HIM. By 'ime' HE referred to the multitude of conscious beings in the confronting army. By 'sarve vayam' HE summarised that in this way there were countless mutually distinct conscious beings. 

3. Contrary theories of some existing philosophies are discussed below and rejected based on śāstric evidence.

Voidism: They say that this world is the result of a combination of the 5 elements of nature namely ether, air,

fire, water, earth. Just as areca nut, lime and betel leaves combine to give red colour which is not originally

seen in any of them, the combination of the five elements results in consciousness and there is no separate

entity called ātma as such. 

Non-Dualism/ Advaita: This philosophy says that Brahman alone is the truth and the world is an illusion. All

the objects of the world are not seen before their birth and after their destruction. If they were real

(satyam), then they should have existed at all the three times i.e past, present and future. Just as a

magician manifests unreal things in front of us with his māyā (magical force), likewise this world too appears

to exist. The vedas talk about Paramātmā, the possessor of this māyā to be manifesting this world and

appearing as many on account of it. This māyā is dependent on Brahman, veils Brahman, projects the

universe, gets modified into panca mahā bhutas (ether, air, fire, water, earth) and their further

modifications. This māyā is like a mirror which has the ability to hold a reflection. The reflection of Brahman

formed on this pure māyā makes it appear as Īśwara. Reflections of Brahman on the various modifications of

this māyā called antaḥkaranas (inner instruments - mind, intellect, ego and memory) appear as the

various jīvas. Since Īśwara, panca mahā bhutas/5 elements, all substances which are modifications of these

bhutas and jīvas are all an effect of māya itself, they are all unreal. Thus Brahman alone is the truth and

everything else is an illusion (Brahma satyaṃ jagan mithya).

There are other versions of Non-Dualism too where

1)Some declare that the jīva is the unchanging Brahman, ignorant of its real nature. 

2)Some declare that there is only one jīva in the material body. All the other bodies and souls are like those

seen in a dream. They lack personal consciousness. Liberation of this whole world is the destruction of

ignorance of this single jīva.

3)Others declare that there is only one jīva and he is Hiranyagarbha- the reflection of Brahman. The

other jīvas are only semblances of Hiranyagarbha. They believe that there are many material bodies, each

provided with an unreal jīva.

4)Another view holds that there is only one jīva which resides in each of the many bodies by means of its

powers.  

Bhaskara Philosophy: It propounds that just as the single surface of the moon when reflected on a knife,

gemstone, river, ocean and such other real upādhis (substrata) appears as many different moons. Also, just

as the same boundless space present in a ghata (vessel), kamandala (water pot) and such other real

upādhis appears differently as ghatākāśa, kamandalākāśa, etc, likewise, the one ātma when reflected on or

combined with truly existing antaḥkaranas as upādhis, appears as many. According to them, even

though the upādhis are real, the appearance of different souls is an illusion. They differ from Non-Dualists in

their belief that upādhis are illusionary.

These philosophies do not support our interpretation of Kṛṣṇa’s above instruction where HE talks about the existence of real souls, distinct from HIM and also mutually distinct. To establish the authenticity of our interpretation, we will analyse their philosophies on the basis of logic and śāstra to point out the flaws in them.  

dehabhedābhiprāyeṇa bahuvacanam nātmabhedābhiprāyeṇa (Plurality i.e appearance of multiple souls, is due to the differences in bodies and not the distinction in souls). This interpretation by Non-Dualists that  Kṛṣṇa is using the terms 'I', 'you', 'them' and 'all of us' on the basis of differences in bodies is against their own philosophy because as per their philosophy only one soul exists and the illusory appearance of different souls is similar to the appearance of different bodies, since bodies too are a result of illusion. Moreover their theory is not acceptable to the madhyemārgasthas too (those not belonging to any school of philosophy like Non-Dualism, Qualified Non-Dualism, etc, eg: Buddhists). Even the followers of Philosophy of Bhaskara who believe in the temporary but real existence of different physical bodies can question the Non-Dualists on how Kṛṣṇa can differentiate on the basis of illusionary bodies? That there is only one soul, is believed by both philosophies.

Many statements from vedas cannot find relevance with the philosophy of Non-Dualism where the single soul reflecting on illusionary antaḥkaranas as upādhis appears as many or the Philosophy of Bhaskara where the single soul reflecting on truly existing upādhis appears as many. 

For eg: The statement nityo nityānāṃ cetanaś cetanānām eko bahūnāṃ yo vidadhāti kāmān Svetāsvatara Up 6.13, Kaṭha.Up 5.13 (The one eternal conscious being who grants the wishes of all the eternal multiple conscious beings) This statement confirms what the omniscient Kṛṣṇa in this śloka talks about the distinction between HIM and the other souls and also about distinction among the souls. In this statement from the vedas, nityo nityānāṃ (chief eternal entity among all eternals) clearly refutes the concept of temporary nature of the soul (Philosophy of Voidism) and also the concept of appearance of plurality in souls due to presence of upādhis (Philosophy of Non-Dualism and Philosophy of Bhaskara). 

cetanaś cetanānām (chief conscious entity among all conscious entities) means that the souls are naturally knowledgeable. This refutes the concept propounded by the Vaiśeṣikas that soul's knowledge is transient. yaḥ ekaḥ nityaḥ cetanaḥ, this declaration that there is only one eternally existing entity called Paramātma who fulfils the wishes of all other eternal entities refutes all the theories that consider trimūrtis (Brahma, Viṣṇu and Maheśwara) and all the devatas as Paramātmas. 

yo vidadhāti kāmān declares that the one eternal conscious Paramātma is the granter of everyone's wishes and thus refutes the concept of apūrva (that which has not existed before, which arises from Karma and which is the granter of fruit, a karmic account which grants fruits).

Summary: All the souls are eternal and changeless just like the Supreme soul or Paramātma (Kṛṣṇa). There is distinction between Paramātma and the other souls and distinction among the souls too with each soul having its distinct existence.

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Theories propounded by the Philosophy of Non-Dualism which are anupapatti (not supporting vedic assertions) are addressed and disproved below. As their philosophy is the most popular and widespread, it has become a necessity to contest and disprove their inaccurate theories. The intention is purely that the receiver of the Bhagawad Gītā gets authentic knowledge inline with the vedas, as desired by Kṛṣṇa.

Non-Dualist's view: Due to ignorance, the jīvas have a pluralistic view of the world i.e they see diversity in the world. In reality only pure consciousness exists and Gītā śāstra came into existence to instruct this alone. nirviśeṣa kūtastha nitya chaitanya (unqualified, unchanging, eternal consciousness), such a single soul is the only truth. Since qualities are the basis for differentiation, to be nirviśeṣa (unqualified) means to be devoid of the 3 visible differences in qualities in this world namely:

1)Sajātīya bheda (Intra difference): Differences between objects of the same jāti. Eg: A mango tree is different

from an apple tree though they both belong to the same jāti of objects called trees.

2)Vijātīya bheda (Inter difference): Differences between objects belonging to completely different jātis. Eg: A

mango tree belonging to the jāti of trees is different from a mountain belonging to a totally different jāti.

3)Svagata bheda (Self difference): Differences within the same object. Eg: Leaves, roots, flowers, etc, are all

part and parcel of the same tree and yet roots are not the tree, leaves are not the tree and flowers are

different from the tree.  

Since no substance exists other than the one eternal consciousness, this pure consciousness is devoid of sajātīya and vijātīya bhedas. Also, since this Brahman is unqualified (attribute less) there is no svagata bheda.

This unqualified consciousness is kūtastha (unchanging). The word kūtastha has multiple meanings.

kūtayuddhā hi rākṣasaḥ, from statements like these we see that kūtastha means deception. Māyā which makes the non-existent appear like it exists and thus deceives is called 'kūta'. Since this eternal consciousness is enjoined by māyā it is called kūtastha. Or kūtastha also refers to the natural source material for all the different substances. Here, since the source material for all the substances seen in this world is the eternal consciousness, it is called kūtastha. Alternatively kūta is also the name of the anvil on which the blacksmith places the iron which is nicely heated in his furnace and forges it into desired forms by beating it. kūtavat tiṣtatīti kūtasthaḥ (Anything similar to kūta is called kūtasthaḥ). As per this derivation, like the blacksmith's forge, this consciousness which does not undergo a change in itself but becomes the cause for the deformation of other untrue substances is called kūtastha.

Consciousness which is unqualified, unchangeable is also said to be nitya (eternal). Being eternal means not being severed by time. Such a single ātma referred to as consciousness is the only truth, all plurality that appears is an illusion. Kṛṣṇa is instructing this Philosophy of Non-Dualism to Arjuna through the medium of the Bhagawad Gītā.

Our Answer: This theory proposed by them does not support any form of instruction at all and hence instruction of the Gītā śāstra is also not supported as per their theory. This is explained in detail.

Many questions arise when Non-Dualists say that Kṛṣṇa is instructing this philosophy of Non-Dualism in the Bhagawad Gītā.

1. Was Kṛṣṇa instructing the meaning of the Gītā śāstra known to HIM? or not known to HIM?

2. If HE was instructing the meaning known to HIM, did HE know it by direct perception or by hearing only?

3. If Kṛṣṇa was instructing the meaning known to HIM by either direct perception or hearing, was HIS ignorance

removed or not? 

4. In case the ignorance was removed, was the illusion of plurality caused by the ignorance also removed or

not?

As an answer to questions 1 and 3, it can be said that since the Non-Dualists have written a commentary for Kṛṣṇā's Gītā with great reverence, it is certain that they do not think that Kṛṣṇa instructed the Gītā without knowing it's meaning or that HIS ignorance was not removed (as asked in the 3rd question). 

Since Kṛṣṇa's knowledge of the meaning of the Gītā śāstra and removal of HIS ignorance are now agreed upon, to justify their answers to questions 2 and 4 in line with their philosophy, the Non-Dualists will have to agree to one of the 4 premises.

Premise #1: After knowing by direct perception followed by removal of ignorance and also the removal of the

resulting illusion of plurality, Kṛṣṇa was instructing the Gītā.

Premise #2: After knowing by direct perception followed by removal of ignorance but not the illusion of plurality

caused by it, Kṛṣṇa was instructing the Gītā.

Premise #3: After knowing by hearing followed by removal of ignorance and illusion of plurality caused by it,

Kṛṣṇa was instructing the Gītā.

Premise #4: After knowing by hearing followed by removal of ignorance but not the illusion of plurality caused

by it, Kṛṣṇa was instructing the Gītā.

All 4 premises are unacceptable. Given below are the reasons.

Analysis of Premise #1: The 1st Premise is that on directly perceiving the unqualified, unchanging, eternal consciousness called soul followed by the removal of ignorance and illusion of plurality, Kṛṣṇa was instructing the Gītā. This premise is discussed here and proved to be unacceptable.

This Kṛṣṇa is Paramapuruṣa, so HE cannot be possessing untrue knowledge like the jīvas. HE is the possessor of true knowledge alone. When meaning is explained to someone, the instructor is expected to know that many aspects are involved like the meaning being instructed, ācārya, the words conveying it, eligible disciple to hear it, the result obtained from hearing it. Only one who can see these as distinct can be willing to instruct. According to the Non-Dualists, all these distinctions are untrue. This Kṛṣṇa is Paramapuruṣa who possesses real knowledge and is free from the illusion of plurality resulting from untrue knowledge. As Illusion of plurality caused due to ignorance is not present in HIM, the resulting acts of delivering instructions, making others follow the instructions and such other activities are not applicable to HIM. When this is the case, how can actions like preaching or delivering instructions, etc, happen after causes like ignorance and illusion of plurality are removed? Innumerable defects like vyāghātaṃ (one contradicting the other), apasiddhāntaṃ (speaking contrary to one’s philosophy), inability to begin a śāstra, mode of instruction not working out, efforts turning futile, philosophy becoming contrary to the vedas, etc, too occur.

This premise #1 is not in accordance with their philosophy.

Analysis of Premise #2: The 2nd Premise is that on directly perceiving the soul, ignorance is removed but not the resulting illusion of plurality Kṛṣṇa was instructing the Gītā. This premise is discussed here and proved to be unacceptable.

The Non-Dualists say that, even after a cloth is burnt, it will still appear like a cloth to the one who knows that the cloth is burnt. To the one who knows that it is only a sight of water in the mirage, the water in the mirage still appears as water. This phenomenon is called bādhitānuvṛtti. In a similar way, Kṛṣṇa can still view the plurality due to past vāsanas (latent tendencies in the form of impressions on the mind) though illusion of plurality is removed, hence it is possible for HIM to take up the task of instructing. Just as a burnt cloth or water in a mirage cannot serve the purpose which a proper cloth or actual water can serve, even though Kṛṣṇa's illusion of plurality is not removed due to the strength of previous vāsanas, it will not cause any effect. 

This concept of bādhitānuvṛtti is not acceptable here because one who actually knows about the burnt cloth will not attempt to wear it, though it may appear to him like a cloth and one who knows that the appearance of water in the mirage is not actually water, will not think of taking it out from the mirage. Similarly, even when the illusion of plurality is removed but its effect remains due to the impact of past vāsanas, his knowledge that 'All plurality that is visible in this illusion is untrue' will be so strong that he will not be enthusiastic about activities like preaching. Thus, even if it is agreed that Kṛṣṇa is under the influence of bādhitānuvṛtti, it cannot be accepted that HE can instruct the revered Gītā on account of it. Thus premise #2 is unacceptable.

Analysis of Premise #3: Here, Premise #3 is discussed and proved to be unacceptable. While analysing premise1 it has already been proved that it is not possible to deliver instructions after both ignorance and the illusion of plurality are removed. To know an unqualified substance by direct perception or hearing amounts to the same. Hence, premise #3 is also rejected on the same grounds that premise #1 was rejected. Thus premise 3 is unacceptable.

Analysis of Premise #4: Here, as per the 4th Premise the Non-Dualists say that Kṛṣṇa who is Sarveśwara was earlier ignorant. Later, upon hearing the śāstra and knowing it, HE gained the true knowledge.The ignorance is removed but due to bādhitānuvṛtti, the illusion of plurality still exists and hence Kṛṣṇa is instructing the Gītā. This is discussed below and proved to be unacceptable.

This Kṛṣṇa is Sarveśwara. To say that HE had ignorance earlier is totally unacceptable because HE cannot be Sarveśwara then. If it is still said that Īśwarā HIMSELF was ignorant earlier then it cannot be that HE heard the śāstras and acquired true knowledge from them because there exists no one greater or more knowledgeable than Kṛṣṇa who can instruct śāstras. Suppose such a being existed, again the question will arise as to how he acquired this knowledge of Non-Dualism and the only way it can be answered is by agreeing that there existed someone who was capable of instructing him too. Thus an endless sequence of Īśwarās gets created and this results in a sustainability fault called 'anavasthādoṣaṃ'. To say that there are many such Sarvāheśwaras is also not correct because countless statements from the śrutis and smṛtis like eko devaḥ, dev eko nārāyanaḥ announce that there is only one Sarveśwara and statements such as nityo nārāyanaḥ, declare that HE is eternal. Hence plurality cannot be considered for Sarveśwara. If it is said that true knowledge can be gained from the śāstrās alone which are created by that one Īśwarā, then the vedās that we all agree and believe to be 'apauruṣeya' i.e unauthored and beginningless will have to be authored and have a beginning. Moreover, only upon gaining true knowledge it is possible for Īśwarā to deliver the vedās. If it is said that Īśwara gained the true knowledge from the vedās alone, then 'anyonyāśrayadoṣa' (fallacy of mutual dependence) will arise.

To say that, Kṛṣṇa forgot the knowledge of the eternal vedas and was now regaining this knowledge of Non-Dualism by recollecting, is also not acceptable. Though forgotten, recollection of knowledge now, can happen only if the knowledge was experienced earlier. If it is accepted that HE experienced it in the past, the question will arise: Who instructed it to HIM at that time?

Such questions and fallacies are bound to arise and they would contest against the śrutī, smṛtī statements too such as  yaḥ sarvagnaḥ sarvavit Munḍakopanishad 1.2.9 (that Paramapuruṣa who knows the essential nature of all the substances), parāsya saktir vividhaiva srūyate Svetasvatara Up 6.7 (it is heard  from the śrutīs that this Paramapuruṣa possesses sakti(power), jñāna(wisdom), bala (strength) and kriyā (action) in varied natural and great forms), vedāham samatītāni vartamānāni cārjuna bhavisyāni ca bhūtāni mām tu veda na kascana B.G 7.26 (O Arjuna, I know all beings that have been in the past, those now in the present and those yet to come, but no one knows me) and many statements from the smṛtīs which announce that Paramapuruṣa Kṛṣṇa alone is eternally naturally established in knowledge.

It is thus not appropriate to say that, 'In the beginning Kṛṣṇa was ignorant, later through the śāstrās HE gained knowledge and as a result his ignorance was removed but the illusion of plurality that resulted due to ignorance was still there. Premise #3 and Premise #4 which talk about this are thus unacceptable.

From all of the above it is clear that when seen in the light of the philosophy of Non-Dualism, there is no good reason for Kṛṣṇa to instruct the Bhagawad Gītā .

Non-Dualist's view: Non-Dualists further state that Kṛṣṇa is the instructing ācārya and Arjuna is the disciple receiving the instruction. 

Our Answer: This is unacceptable as per their own philosophy where no two exist. The same applies to the present day ācāryas and their disciples in āśramas too. Reasons are discussed below.

As Non-Dualists cannot accept any of the below conditions for the instructor like

1.These ācāryas are instructing about the nature of the non-dual ātma without actually knowing it

2.They have doubts about ātma's nature or are deceiving by preaching about illusion 

3.They are just repeating what someone else has instructed 

4.They are childlike 

5.They are unbalanced and speak whatever comes to their mind. 

Therefore Non-Dualists will have to agree that the ācāryas are instructing only upon knowing about the ātma and that even after gaining the knowledge, the illusion of plurality still exists for them, otherwise instruction would not be possible (as discussed above)

Then the question arises, 'Who are these Non-Dualist ācāryas preaching their philosophy of ātma to?'

In line with their philosophy of Non-Dualism, this question can be further broken down as follows 

I. IS THE ĀCĀRYA INSTRUCTING HIMSELF OR OTHERS

2.1 HIMSELF 2.2 OTHERS

3.1 Is he instructing 3.2 Is he instructing 5.1 Real others 5.2 Others who are himself assumed to himself assumed to a result of illusion.

be different from be same as himself. 

his own self.

6.1 Knowing that 6.2 Assuming

4.1 Is he instructing 4.2  Is he instructing the visible other the visible

such a different himself such a different himself    is illusory. other as real.

who has knowledge and agreed to be different

ability to experience. under the influence

of illusion.

The above views are analysed and disproved as follows

View 1- 2.1- 3.1- 4.1: Instructing such a 'different himself' is against Non-Dualism as no two exist in their philosophy. Moreover, one who considers himself to be actually different from himself is ignorant for sure.

View 1- 2.1- 3.1- 4.2: Instructing someone who is agreed to be a 'different himself' due to the effect of illusion is as good as instructing knowledge to vandhya putra (a barren woman's son) as that is also a result of illusion. The term Vandhya putra is used in general to express an impossibility or a non-entity.

View 1- 2.1- 3.2: Instructing one who is agreed to be the same as himself, without the need for disciples like Arjuna would be useless. Of what use is instructing one's own self who already has knowledge.

View 1- 2.2- 5.1: Instructing real others, is not agreeable to Non-Dualists as their philosophy does not agree to a real difference in ātmas though a difference in bodies is visible due to māyā.

View 1- 2.2- 5.2: Instructing an illusionary other is not acceptable just as in view 4.2 for it will then have to be agreed that instruction can be delivered to vandhya putra or a reflection in spite of knowing that they are illusions. And this is not acceptable.

View 1- 2.2- 6.1: Instructing disciples like Arjuna after knowing that they are a product of illusion(though a single entity in reality its appearance as another as in the case of reflection) by the power of his knowledge of Non-Dualism. No sane person will deliver any instructions to his own image seen in gemstone, knife, mirror, etc, knowing very well that they are not different from him forget about delivering instructions leading to mokṣa (liberation). When only a child or a mad man can perform such a task, will the all knowing Sarveśwara do it?

View 1- 2.2- 6.2: If the ācārya is assuming the illusionary other person to be real and preaching to him, it is certain that he is unfit for preaching as he himself failed to know the reality. 

From all of the above it is clear that according to Non-Dualist philosophy it is not possible for Kṛṣṇa to be the ācārya preaching Non-Dualism and Arjuna to be the disciple receiving the instructions.

It has also been clarified that, bādhitānuvṛtti can occur and by the strength of the previous vāsanas, the illusion of plurality(detested by the Non-Dualists) can continue to remain visible, but delivering instructions on that basis is not possible. (Refer to Premises #1, #2, #3, #4 above)

Non-Dualist's view: As per the fundamental philosophy of Non-Dualism that ātma alone exists in reality, existence of everything else other than ātma gets refuted, implying that they are all illusionary. Hence, the eternal māyā, avidya (ignorance), etc, which cause the illusion of plurality are destroyed by this knowledge.

Our Answer: When the causes such as avidya, etc, are destroyed then the resulting effect which is the illusion of plurality should not exist too. After the defect is removed there is no chance that illusion caused by it will remain. However, it can be seen that this eternal vision of plurality did not get destroyed so far by any possible means including this knowledge of Non-Dualism. Hence, there is no chance that it can ever be destroyed. Then, for Brahman there remains no other way but to remain eternally in this world of illusion.

Non-Dualist's view: The Non-Dualists quote the example that due to timiradoṣa (defect in vision), a person sees a single moon as two. His friend comes and clarifies to him that it is only one moon and not two. As a result the person's illusion of a double moon is eliminated. Even though the illusion is removed he still sees a double moon and this effect is called 'bādhitānuvṛtti'. In a similar way, after the illusion of plurality is destroyed, differences are still visible to the Non-Dualist. 

Our Answer: This view is not acceptable.

Though his illusive vision of the double moon got corrected because of his friend's instruction, the true cause of this faulty knowledge of two moons (the eye defect called timiradoṣa) was not eliminated. Hence double vision still continued in his case. Due to timiradoṣa, his direct perception was still of two moons but he could no longer make a statement that there were two moons because of the information he received from his well wisher who was free from this defect. But here, with the real knowledge that ātma alone exists in reality and everything else is an illusion, the unreal defect called 'ignorance' appended to the ātma which is the cause of differentiating knowledge, must be eliminated. If it does not get eliminated with this real knowledge, it never will. After becoming defect free, still perceiving differences in the world of things and behaving in accordance with the plurality, is not at all possible. 

In the earlier example, the timiradoṣa which was a real reason for the double moon vision was not the subject of guidance from the well wisher. The subject was to convey that there was only one moon. Hence the defect was not removed. Surgical treatments alone could correct it. In our case, the real target of action for the knowledge that 'ātma alone is the truth' which is the remover of all illusionary knowledge, is the 'unreal ignorance' which is the cause of 'bheda-jñāna' (the illusion of differences). Hence, this knowledge alone can destroy it and nothing else. Hence bādhitānuvṛtti can be accepted in the case of double moon vision but not in the case of bheda-jñāna.

Moreover in the case of double moon vision, defect free guidance from a well wisher is more predominant than the direct perception caused due to the defect. Hence in that case, shortfalls can be mitigated. However, in our case the 'illusion of differences' which must be removed and 'ātmaikya-jñāna' (the knowledge that only one soul exists) which must remove it, are both established based on ignorance and equally dominant. Hence one removing the other out of these, is not possible. If such a dogmatic theory is still put forth that 'It will remove the differentiating illusion', then the argument can arise that, when both are equally dominant, why should bheda-jñāna not remove ātmaikya-jñāna?

Non-Dualist's view: The Non-Dualists say that since they understood that bheda-jñāna (destroyed knowledge) is solely a result of avidya and since it is incomprehensible that ātmaikya-jñāna (destroying knowledge) is also a result of avidya, they claim that ātmaikya-jnāna removes bheda jnāna. 

Our Answer: This claim by the Non-Dualists can be disproved as follows. When Non-Dualist study the meaning of the sentence 'ātma alone exists in reality' carefully, they will come to know that everything other than the ātma is a product of illusion. This means that he will come to know that his ātmaikya-jnāna i.e 'knowledge that ātma alone exists in reality' is also an illusion. So he cannot claim that he does not know that ātmaikya-jnāna is an illusion. If he might still think that ātmaikya-jnāna is not an illusion but real then both Brahman and ātmaikya-jñāna will have to be real and this is against the philosophy of Non-Dualism which states that brahman alone exists in reality and everything else is an illusion. If they say that ātmaikya-jñāna is nothing but the true nature of Brahman, it can be countered by saying that since by nature Brahman is eternal, HE will have to be ever liberated and never bound thus countering their theory again.

Non-Dualist's view: If the Non-Dualists say that they could not understand that ātmaikya-jñāna was unreal since ātma was incomprehensible, however they knew that bheda-jñāna was not true.

Our Answer: Based on this statement of theirs it cannot be concluded that bhedas alone which are the subject of bheda-jñāna, are an illusion. If such a conclusion is accepted, then further contradictions will arise. For eg: Suppose a person perceives silver as a pearl shell. Here the knowledge that it is a pearl shell destroys the knowledge that it is silver. Earlier he did not know that his knowledge (that it was a pearl shell) was untrue. However after knowing that it is actually silver, he came to know that his earlier knowledge was untrue. After his knowledge was corrected, neither did silver which then became the subject of knowledge become untrue nor did the earlier subject of knowledge i.e pearl shell become true.

Applying the similar analogy to the Non-Dualist philosophy too where ātmaikya-jñāna destroyed the bheda-jñāna. After the true meaning conveyed by ātmaikya-jñāna is understood, all the bhedās which are the subject of bheda-jñāna (destroyed knowledge) cannot become untrue and likewise ātmaikya-jñāna cannot become true. Here the destroyed knowledge which is bheda-jñāna is analogous to silver and the knowledge which is destroying it i.e ātmaikya-jñāna is analogous to pearl shell.

Non-Dualist's view: If Non-Dualists say that since ātmaikya-jñāna is the latter, it will remove the earlier bheda-jnāna.

Our Answer: The claim of Non-Dualists that since ātmaikya-jñāna is the latter, it will remove the earlier bheda-jnāna, is not appropriate. Since bheda-jñāna and ātmaikya-jñāna are both caused by defect alone, just being the latter cannot make it powerful enough to destroy the earlier. If that was the case then a deluded person's statement that everything is an illusion which always follows all other statements that claim every single thing to be real will destroy them. If Non-Dualists say, 'Yes! Let it be so', then the statement of Non-Dualists that ātma alone exists in reality will get destroyed by the statement of Madhyamaka school of Buddhists that everything which has ātma is untrue. Hence it is concluded that, it is inappropriate for the Non-Dualists to say that the latter statement obstructs the prior when it is known that both are a product of illusion. 

Since Non-Dualists claim that bheda-jñāna, visible bhedas (which are its subject) and beginningless māyā (which is the cause of the bhedās) are all untrue and are all removed by ātmaikya-jñāna, it is not possible for them to consider that either due to beginning less ignorance or past impressions of these bhedas, bādhitānuvṛtti can occur. 

Summary of the above: In accordance with their philosophy, beginning from Sarveśwara up to everyone in the guru parampara of Non-Dualists even if one ācārya possessed real knowledge, vision of plurality and the resulting deliverance of instructions were not possible for him. Absence of real knowledge in him implies that both ignorance and its cause avidya were present in him and preaching by the ignorant is invalid. If there was real knowledge, only illustrations for bādhitānuvṛtti would be double moon vision and the likes. In the absence of real knowledge, even bādhitānuvrtti won't exist. Thus it can be concluded that there is no reason for Non-Dualists to write either a purport or give sermons on the Bhagawad Gītā.    

So far it has been logically concluded that there is no good reason for Non-Dualists to preach the Gītā. Kṛṣṇa as the deliverer and Arjuna as the receiver of the knowledge of Gītā, is not supported per their philosophy.

Hence forth it will be discussed and proved on the basis of their own philosophy that propagation of Non-Dualism serves no good purpose.

Non-Dualism has two schools of thought namely 'jīva-ajñāna' and 'brahma-ajñāna'. Both will be explained along with their respective flaws.

Jīva-ajñāna: The philosophy of this school of Non-Dualism is as follows. The unique brahman who is consciousness only, gets fructified by 'avidya' and its cause 'māyā' to become Īśwara (also called saguṇa brahman i.e qualified brahman) and multiple jīvas. Liberation from saṃsāra happens only after all these jīvas and Īśwara gain the knowledge of Non-Dualism. No sane person will preach to his own form and even a child will know that such preaching is useless. Hence, as per this school of thought too preaching of their knowledge serves no purpose. This contamination extends naturally to the brahma-ajñāna aspect too.   

Brahma-ajñāna: The one and only conscious brahman, gets covered by ignorance called avidya and transforms into a single jīva. Just as one sees many people in his dream, this unparalleled jīva sees multiple jīvās and this world as a result of his delusion. This single jīvā alone really exists and all the other jīvas and the world are a product of his imagination. It is not known by anyone which country or which body this single jīvā resides in. When a dreamer wakes up all the characters and places in his dream get destroyed and he gets into the state of reality. Similarly, when this single jīva comes to know about the reality by acquiring the knowledge of Non-Dualism, this world and the many jīvas which were his own creation get destroyed, he becomes free from ignorance and attains the pure one-consciousness state.

As per this school of thought too, preaching of their knowledge serves no purpose. In addition to the reasons quoted earlier for the same, some more are discussed and proved below. Let's ask the Non-Dualists some questions. 

Question 1: Here, is Kṛṣṇa, the deliverer of Gītā śāstra, a real jīva or a fictitious jīva?

Answer: If they claim that Kṛṣṇa is that real jīva, then as HE is an ācārya, HIS Non-Dualistic

knowledge of ātma must destroy Brahma-ajñāna and its effects like discipleship, professorship, etc. As a

result, instructor, listener or the medium for instruction like knowledge, etc, must not exist anymore which

will make it inappropriate to say that Kṛṣṇa delivered the Gītā śāstra for disciple Arjuna's sake. Moreover, the

act itself is of no use. This leaves Non-Dualists with the only option to say that Kṛṣṇa and other Non-Dualist

ācāryās like HIM are all fictitious jīvas and just as a dream remains unaffected by the knowledge of a

person seen in a dream, the world also remains unaffected by fictitious Kṛṣṇa's knowledge. Preaching such

knowledge for destroying the existence of this illusionary world is a futile task too.

However they still opine that delivering instruction can make a useful impact to the world. Hence we

question them further... 

Question 2 Is disciple Arjuna real or fictitious? If it is said that Arjuna is that single real jīva, what is the

proof for it?

Answer: It is not possible for Non-Dualists to provide any proof. Moreover no ācārya will think that this

disciple of mine, this jīva is going to get liberated due to my preachings and like the dreamers see many

characters in their dreams, I am a character which is this disciple's fictitious creation. Even if the ācārya

assumes so, he surely cannot deliver instructions to that ungrateful someone who will be destroying him

eventually (just as all its characters die when a person's dream ends). It is natural for the ācārya to think

that, 'if the dream dies down by itself, let it, why should I destroy the dream and in turn destroy my own

self'. When this is the case, ācārya will not even practise the means of liberation in the first place. On the

other hand if the disciple thinks that, like the various people he sees in a dream, this ācārya is also a

fictitious creation of his mind, he will surely not be willing to hear anything from such an ācārya. If he knows

that the guru and his knowledge are created as a result of his own delusion, will the disciple try to

understand any deeper meanings from the guru? It is a matter of humour to say that his delusion will be

removed by a discourse of deluded knowledge by an ācārya who is his own creation. More so to say that the

Arjuna's own delusion will remove itself. Moreover, thousands of years have passed since Arjuna received the

knowledge of Gītā and deluded vision of the world is still not removed. Non-Dualists are left with no other

option but to agree that Arjuna too, like all the disciples and ācāryas of Non-Dualism who have existed so

far, is a fictitious creation of another jīva existing in reality. Declarations in the śāstras such as śuko muktaḥ

vāmadevo vimuktaḥ that many have attained mukti (liberation) so far is also a delusion for them. Thus

Non-Dualists will have to agree that all the endeavours made by Kṛṣṇa, Arjuna, Ādisaṇkara, etc. for the

attainment of mokṣa leaving aside all other motives, have gone in vain. So, preaching of the Gītā from

Arjuna's time up till now must be agreed to be totally futile. Knowing well that he himself is the

fictitious creation of someone, no ācārya will instruct this Gītā knowledge and cause his own destruction.

Likewise no disciple will ask for instruction which will result in his own destruction. Thus there remains no

path forever for the attainment of mokṣa for that one real jīva. In the disciple's case too, though his

knowledge is illusionary, since his ātmaikya-jñāna is opposed to bheda jñāna, it is most likely the

destroyer of his bheda jñāna which again makes the ācārya's preaching of knowledge futile .

Thus it is concluded that this whole process of preaching of a śāstra in this way, the deliverer of knowledge, the disciple receiving knowledge, etc, does not work out to give a fruitful result in the context of Non-Dualism.

'Bear has hair all over, wherever touched', in a similar way, any concept taken up in the light of Non-Dualism ends up being declared faulty. From all the above elaboration, it is seen that if the theory of Non-Dualism is accepted, there remains no good reason for Kṛṣṇa to instruct the Bhagawad Gītā.

​

While consuming Kṛṣṇa's nectarian Bhagawad Gītā, it is very unfortunate to be countering the philosophy of Non-Dualism which is full of illogical unattainable statements and imagination. Hence this topic is concluded for now. Those who wish to know more may study Sribhāṣyam, Śrutaprakāśika, Śataduṣaṇi and such other works of previous Śrivaiṣnava ācāryas.